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Damages Under the Privacy Act: Is Emotional Harm
"Actual"?

INTRODUCTION

The Social Security Administration ("SSA"), the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA"), and the United States
Department of Transportation ("DOT") illegally exchanged pilot
Stanmore Cooper's confidential medical records, disclosing his HIV
positive status to one another.' As the investigation into Cooper's
fitness as a pilot became public knowledge, the press publicized
Cooper's stigmatizing illness.2 A United States District Court in the
Northern District of California found that this information sharing
between agencies was illegal, violating the federal Privacy Act of
1974.1 Despite this finding, the court held that Cooper was not
entitled to any damages for his emotional suffering-which included
anxiety, humiliation, fear of social ostracism, and severe emotional
distress-caused by the government's invasion of his privacy.4 The
court in Cooper v. Federal Aviation Administration' justified this

paradox by reasoning that the Privacy Act compensates victims for
"actual damages" and that the phrase "actual damages" is strictly
limited to pecuniary harm, excluding nonpecuniary harm like the kind
Cooper suffered.6 As a result of the court's reasoning, a question
*
1.
2008).
2.
3.
Act:

© 2009 Nicole M. Quallen.
Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19. The government agencies violated the following provision of the Privacy

No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by
any means of communication to any other person, or to another agency, except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would
be ...(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and
described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section ....
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006). The court determined that the use of Cooper's records was not
"routine." Cooper, No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 19.
4. Cooper, No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 19, 25. The emotional distress Cooper suffered
is discussed in his complaint. See Complaint at 8, Cooper, No. C 07-1383.
5. No. C 07-1383 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,2008).
6. Id. at 22-23.
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emerges: did the Cooper court correctly interpret the Privacy Act
when it denied Cooper compensation?
The Cooper court ultimately relied on the canon of sovereign

immunity to reach its decision, which downplayed the importance of
interpreting the phrase "actual damages." 7 Instead of taking on the

controversial and thorny enterprise of interpreting the statutory
meaning of the phrase "actual damages," the court limited its
discussion to a review of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' construction

of the phrase.8 Not persuaded by the reasoning of either circuit,
however, the Cooper court found that because ambiguity existed in
the phrase "actual damages," the canon of sovereign immunity
dictated the outcome of the case, and that the ambiguity would be

resolved in favor of the government. Consequently, this prohibited
Cooper from recovering for his emotional damages.9
This Recent Development challenges the holding of the Cooper
court. Part I explains the Cooper court's reasoning. Part II explores
the language and the purpose of the Privacy Act. In Part III, this
Recent Development criticizes the Cooper court's reliance on the

canon of sovereign immunity to form the backbone of its argument.
In response to the Cooper court's discussion of Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit precedent, Part IV highlights the difficulty and inconsistency

that result in relying on legislative history to interpret a statute. Part
V considers the purpose, policy, plain meaning, and relevant
precedent of the Privacy Act to conclude that the phrase "actual
damages" should include nonpecuniary harm. Accordingly, the
Cooper court should have interpreted the Privacy Act to allow waiver

of the government's immunity to suit for emotional harm, permitting
Cooper to recover.

7. Id. at 24. ("The court need not, however, conduct its own analysis of the legislative
history to reach the conclusion that mental distress alone does not satisfy the Privacy Act's
actual damages requirement.").
8. Id. at 25. This Recent Development agrees with the Cooper court that neither the
reasoning of the Johnson court nor the reasoning of the Fitzpatrick court can decide this
case. To be sure, Johnson shows that traditional canons of statutory interpretation can be
used to hold that the phrase "actual damages" includes emotional harm. This Recent
Development, however, advances the proposition that purposivism combined with
traditional statutory interpretation, like that in Johnson, yields the most accurate result.
See generally Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983) (relying on parts
of the legislative history to find that the phrase "actual damages" does include emotional
harm); Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue Serv., 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982) (using parts of
the legislative history to hold that the phrase "actual damages" does not include emotional
harm).
9. Cooper, No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 25.
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I. THE COURT'S DECISION IN COOPERV. FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION

Stanmore Cooper was a pilot, certified to fly with an airman

license granted by the FAA."° Cooper was also HIV positive." In
2002 the DOT began investigating certified pilots to find potential

discrepancies between their medical exams needed for licensure and
their medical records submitted to other government agencies,
specifically those records used to seek government benefits. 2 During
this investigation (known as "Operation Safe Pilot"), the DOT
discovered that Cooper reported his HIV positive status to the SSA,
which allowed him to receive disability benefits. 3 Cooper, however,
had not reported his HIV positive status on his airman medical
certification. 4 The DOT obtained this information from the SSA
through a transfer of Cooper's records and relayed it to FAA

personnel during a meeting in January 2005.15 These government
agencies completed this information transfer without Cooper's
consent and without a valid exemption to the Privacy Act's
prohibition on inter-agency sharing.16

As a result of this investigation, Cooper's airman license was

revoked.17 The federal government pressed charges against Cooper

for making false statements to a government agency. 8 Cooper pled
guilty to charges of making false statements to a government agency,19

and the court fined him and sentenced him to probation for the
offense.2" The press covered Cooper's case, which revealed Cooper's
previously private medical condition.2' Because Cooper's condition

10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 3-4.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 6-7.
16. Id. at 12, 19. The Privacy Act allows information sharing without consent if the
disclosure is within the scope of an agency's routine use regulations as published in the
Federal Register or if the disclosure is compatible with the purposes for which the agency
collected the record. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(1)(B) (2006).
17. Cooper,No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 7.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 7-8. Investigators confronted Cooper at a Starbucks about his HIV status,
and he readily admitted that he purposefully omitted the information from his FAA
medical information. Id. at 7. Cooper's Privacy Act claim does not dispute this charge or
Cooper's own wrongdoing. Id. His claim is about whether the government agencies
violated the Privacy Act in their investigation, which revealed this information. Id.
20. Id. at 7-8.
21. Id. at 21.
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was widely publicized, he suffered "severe emotional distress. 22
Hoping to recover for this violation of privacy and the distress he
suffered, Cooper filed suit against the defendant government agencies
on July 10, 2007, in a district court in the Northern District of
California.23
In early 2008 Cooper and the defendant agencies both moved for
summary judgment on the issue of liability. 24 In spite of the court's
finding that the government agencies had violated the Privacy Act,'
the court ultimately granted the defendant agencies' motion. 26 The
court found that the damages Cooper suffered were not within the
statutorily recoverable category of "actual damages" because,
according to the court, the phrase "actual damages" is limited to
pecuniary harm, excluding nonpecuniary harm, like the emotional
harm Cooper suffered.2 7
The Cooper court's decision is troubling for two reasons. First, it
greatly limits the scope of recovery from the illegal sharing of
information by government agencies.2 8 Second, the decision was
based upon an unnecessarily limited exploration of the statutory
language. A review of the Privacy Act and other relevant statutory
materials reveals that an alternative interpretation of the phrase
"actual damages" exists for adoption as a national standard in all
privacy-related cases. The Cooper court saw the canon of sovereign
immunity as an insurmountable hurdle. 29 However, assessment of the
purpose, policy, relevant precedent, and plain meaning of the Privacy
Act shows that sovereign immunity should not decide the case so
easily. Instead, a comprehensive analysis of these materials suggests
that the phrase "actual damages" includes the nonpecuniary harm
suffered by Cooper. Therefore, a proposed construction of the phrase
22. Id; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing Cooper's distress).
23. See Cooper,No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 1.
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. "[T]he court finds that the SSA-OIG's transmission of Cooper's records to
another agency without his prior consent was unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)." Id. at
19.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 25.
28. The Cooper decision would affect the number of plaintiffs who would be able to
recover under the Privacy Act in a significant way because, as discussed in further detail in
Part V, Privacy Act violations are more likely to cause emotional, rather than pecuniary,
harm. Under the Cooper decision, only plaintiffs who have suffered pecuniary harm will
be able to recover. See infra notes 151, 154-56 and accompanying text.
29. "[T]he issue must be decided by the rule that when 'analyzing whether Congress
has waived the immunity of the United States, [courts] must construe waivers strictly in
favor of the sovereign.' " Cooper, No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 24 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986)).
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"actual damages" that would include nonpecuniary harm necessarily
begins with an examination of the Privacy Act itself.
II. THE PRIVACY ACT
The multifaceted and oft-interpreted right to privacy has meant
many things to many courts.3 ° In one attempt to crystallize this area of
law, Congress codified part of a right to privacy in the federal Privacy
Act of 1974.31 Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina proposed the
Privacy Act, largely in response to the Watergate scandal. 2 The
exposure of personal information involved in the Watergate scandal
as a result of intergovernmental sharing generated a fear, which,
combined with advances in technology, prompted Ervin to propose a
bill that codified citizens' rights of privacy against the government.33
Among other things, the Privacy Act set out to provide
protection for citizens against the federal government's intrusions
into, and disclosures of, personal records.34 In Cooper, the court
looked at a portion of the Privacy Act that guarantees that
government officials who irresponsibly release, share, or handle the
private information of citizens will be held accountable for doing so.3
This provision comports with the larger purpose of the Privacy Act,
which is to "balance the government's need to maintain information
about individuals with the rights of individuals to be protected against
30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing a right to
privacy which rendered unconstitutional laws prohibiting private homosexual sodomy);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding a right of privacy existing in the
"penumbras" of the Constitution, leading to a finding that laws that unreasonably prohibit
abortion are unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(recognizing that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to an expectation of privacy against wiretaps in public phone booths); see
also 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVACY 414-28 (William G. Staples ed., 2007) (listing major
cases and developments in the many areas of privacy law).
31. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, 501 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2006)).
32. U.S.

DEP'T.

OF

JUSTICE,

OVERVIEW

OF

THE

1974

PRIVACY

ACT,

http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact-overview.htm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2009)
(Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE WEB
SITE].

33. Id. (Policy Objectives).
34. The Privacy Act provides a citizen with four civil causes of action against the
federal government for the following violations by a government agency: (1) refusing to
amend a citizen's records as requested; (2) withholding agency records from a citizen after
proper request; (3) failing to maintain a citizen's records with completeness, fairness,
accuracy and timeliness; and (4) for other violations within the Act which produces an
adverse effect on the claimant. Id. (Civil Remedies).
35. See Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 10-11 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2008).
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unwarranted invasions of their privacy stemming from federal
agencies' collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal
information about them."36 To effectuate this purpose, the Act
creates four policy objectives:
(1) To restrict disclosure of personally identifiable records
maintained by agencies. (2) To grant individuals increased
rights of access to agency records maintained on themselves.
(3) To grant individuals the right to seek amendment of agency
records maintained on themselves upon a showing that the
records are not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete. (4) To
establish a code of "fair information practices," which requires
agencies to comply with statutory norms for collection,
maintenance, and dissemination of records.37
Cooper's claim deals with the first policy of restricting information
disclosure.
As part of its enforcement scheme, the Privacy Act provides for
compensation for "actual damages" suffered by an individual that
result from a violation of the Act. 38 The Act provides for four types of
civil remedies for violations: two provide injunctive relief and two
provide for monetary damages. 39 The Privacy Act itself does not
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE WEB SITE, supra note 32 (Policy Objectives).

37. Id. (underlining in original).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006). The relevant damages provision of the Privacy
Act reads:
(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an
amount equal to the sum of(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the
sum of $1,000; and
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as
determined by the court.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A)-(B).
39. "Amendment lawsuits" under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) and "access lawsuits"
under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B) allow victims injunctive relief to require the state to amend
citizen records or to allow access to their own records. "Accuracy lawsuits" under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(1)(D) allow citizens to sue for damages where inaccurate records are kept. Suits
like Cooper's are allowed under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) as "other damages" suits for
mistakes such as unlawful disclosure or for violation of any "other" provisions of the Act
where the adverse effect standing requirement, as well as the intentional or willful
requirement, are met. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1).

340
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comment on whether the phrase "actual damages" is intended to limit
recovery to pecuniary damages, nor does it address a distinction
between pecuniary harm and emotional, nonpecuniary harm in its
text.° Cooper sought monetary damages to compensate for the
disclosure of his records: an injunction could not remedy the damage
resulting from the agencies' exchange. It is clear that the Privacy Act
provided Cooper with a cause of action, but instead of using the
relevant provisions of the Act to decide the case, the court relied on
sovereign immunity.
III. THE CANON OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Cooper court ultimately based its decision solely on the
canon of sovereign immunity.41 Specifically, the Cooper court decided
the case based on prior holdings that " 'ambiguity [concerning]
whether [a particular statute] authorizes a punitive damages
award.., must be resolved in favor of the Government.' "42 The court
stated, "Defendants argue, and the court agrees, that the issue must
be decided by the rule that when 'analyzing whether Congress has
waived the immunity of the United States, [courts] must construe
waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign.., and not enlarge the
waiver beyond what the language requires.' ""4The court found that
the phrase "actual damages" was ambiguous, that Congress had not
expressly waived sovereign immunity as to the type of damages for
which the government would be amenable to suit, and that, as a
result, the phrase "actual damages" must be narrowly construed only
to include pecuniary harm.'
The canon of sovereign immunity is a doctrine deeply embedded
in American law and creates a strong presumption in favor of the
sovereign.45 The canon posits that if a statute does not clearly
abrogate the government's immunity, the government cannot be

40. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE WEB SITE, supra note 32 (Policy Objectives).
41. Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., C 07-1383, slip op. at 24-25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2008).
42. Id. at 25 (quoting Siddiqui v. United States, 359 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004)).
43. Id. at 24 (alterations in original) (quoting Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,
318 (1986)).
44. Id. This Recent Development argues that this is neither the best nor the most
appropriate use of the canon of sovereign immunity.
45. See generally Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 498 (2006) (noting that
particularly in the context of waivers, sovereign immunity creates a presumption in favor
of the government).
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liable. 6 Sovereign immunity protects the government from suit, but it
does so providing that Congress has not waived that immunity in a
statute.47 The government's immunity, therefore, can be waived when
the statute requires the waiver. 48 The force behind the canon of

sovereign immunity comes from the idea that governments are
presumed to be immune from suit and that the legislature must
intentionally and clearly allow a waiver to this longstanding and
important immunity.4 9 This argument carries great force because of

the danger of allowing the government to be overly liable. However,
a problem with this reasoning is that clarity is neither a specialty nor a

goal of the legislature.50 Statutes are purposefully vague in some cases

in order to leave interpretation to the courts and to allow courts to
resolve unforeseen difficulties with the law without requiring
statutory amendment or repeal.5 1 Legislatures are also often vague as
a result of compromise between legislators and the houses of

Congress.52 Recognizing that the legislature must be vague, to a point,
in order to make statutes practicable requires weighing that particular
consideration against the demands of sovereign immunity.
Courts have long applied this canon, 53 but the Cooper court
neglected to note that the canon has recently been questioned 54 and
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 336-39 (2000) (describing the canon
of sovereign immunity in a more rigid form).
47. See id. An abrogation of the state's immunity is synonymous with a "waiver."
48. See Cooper, No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 24.
49. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 336-37; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)

(providing that the Privacy Act is aimed at remedying federal government agency
behavior). One example of where the Act provides for government liability is in
§ 552a(g)(4): "In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of
this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual .
5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(4).
50. TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 165 (2004) ("In the
legislative practice, ambiguity can allow progress to continue on areas of disagreement,
rather than making complete agreement the prerequisite to any agreement.").
51. The doctrine of unconstitutional vagueness applies to criminal statutes and
provides that a statute which is unclear about the behavior that can be sanctioned
criminally cannot withstand the constitutional requirement for notice. Civil laws, however,
do not threaten to take life or liberty of transgressors and thus leave room for vagueness.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 344-45. The rule of lenity applies only to criminal
law to "reflect a commonsense notion that potential criminal defendants are virtually
impossible to organize for political action." Id.
52. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 12 (2008)
("Bills are the result of committee work and political compromise.").
53. See DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW 1

(2005) ("[S]overeignty as recognized today has existed in one form or another for
thousands of years.").
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that the canon of sovereign immunity should be used alongside other
canons of statutory interpretation." Simply put, courts should not use
sovereign immunity as a solution to 5 6every statutory ambiguity
involving government amenability to suit.

One reason that sovereign immunity inappropriately barred
recovery in Cooper's case is because the canon only applies where
language is obviously ambiguous. It is not obvious that the phrase
"actual damages" is ambiguous. 7 Some courts have defined
ambiguity in statutory language as that which is "capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more
senses."58 This definition intends to consider the context of the
statutory scheme and the terms of the statute when asking whether
there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute's
terms. 9 As articulated, however, this definition may be incorrect.60
The question is not whether there can be multiple reasonable

interpretations, but whether, in context, there is more than one
equally plausible meaning to a term or phrase.61 In Cooper's case, the
court should have asked itself whether it is plausible that the phrase
"actual damages" could include emotional harm or exclude emotional

harm.
The dictionary definition of "actual,"62 the reasoning of other
courts, 63 and the purpose of the Privacy Act to compensate victims for
54. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 337 ("[S]trict construction must be justified
on more finely tuned grounds. Some commentators have argued that sovereign immunity
is obsolete-that in modern times, government should be as amenable as private parties to
suit for harm it causes."). Eskridge and his coauthors also note that there exists "tension
between the sovereign immunity canon and contemporary values supporting
compensation for victims of wrongdoing." Id. at 338; see also DOERNBERG, supra note 53,
at 210 (explaining that sovereign immunity shields the government from liability in a way
that runs contrary to constitutional guarantees of protection from the government); John
Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 1121-24 (1993) (questioning
whether there is justice in sovereign immunity and finding that the canon lacks adequate
justification).
55. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 337.
56. Id. at 338.
57. See, e.g., infra Part V.C. (arguing that courts can use the plain meaning of the
phrase "actual damages").
27-36, 681
58. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 2004 WI 158,
N.W.2d 110, 122 (Wis. 2004) (seeking to define the word "refuses" in a Wisconsin statute).
59. Id.
60. See JELLUM, supra note 52, at 69 ("This definition cannot be correct for if it were
then ambiguity would be found in every court case involving a statutory interpretation
issue.").
61. See id. at 70.
62. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
63. See infra Part V.B.
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the harm they are most likely to incur 6' support the idea that
including emotional harm in the phrase "actual damages" is more
plausible than excluding emotional harm. These three supporting
points give context both to the case and to the statutory terms, and
they provide strong support for a conclusion that the phrase "actual
damages" unambiguously refers to all types of damages that a
claimant has suffered at the time of his or her complaint. Therefore, it
was presumptive of the Cooper court to hold that the phrase "actual
damages" was ambiguous.
Sovereign immunity was also an inappropriate basis on which to
decide this case because there is serious doubt about whether the
sovereign immunity canon should trump legislative history, purpose,
and public policy.65 Though the Cooper court examined the reasoning
of other circuit courts66 and also analyzed some of the legislative
history of the Privacy Act,67 the court explicitly based its decision
exclusively on sovereign immunity grounds.6 8 Courts have been
known to rest entire decisions on one canon, like sovereign immunity,
but it would be prudent to consider more than one source of insight in
deciding a question which potentially limits recovery for so many
plaintiffs.69
Because sovereign immunity takes away all redress for citizens
against the government, it seems that courts should only take such a
serious step when they consider other canons of statutory
interpretation. As such, the canon of sovereign immunity should be
dealt with like other canons of statutory interpretation, such as the
canons of lenity and ejusdem generis,7° and the canon of sovereign
immunity should be one of many factors considered when
interpreting a statute. 71 The canon of sovereign immunity, by itself
64. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66. Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 23-24 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 2008).
67. Id. at 22-23.
68. Id. at 24.
69. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 337 ("[Sovereign immunity] is no reason,
standing alone, to construe such a statute narrowly; strict construction must be justified on
more finely tuned grounds.").
70. See supra note 51. The canon of lenity dictates that in the criminal law, where a
statute is vague it shall be interpreted in favor of the defendant, so as to avoid unjust
punishment. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 344-45. The canon of ejusdem generis is
one of the grammar canons, which states that "when general words are near specific
words, the general words should be limited to include only things similar in nature to the
specific words." JELLUM, supra note 52, at 107.
71. See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 339 ("As the sovereign
immunity example indicates, hoary canons sit like loaded guns, to be picked up and even
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and in its most robust form, does allow the Cooper court to exclude
emotional, nonpecuniary damages because the statute did not
explicitly include them.72 However, a stronger ruling resting on the
Privacy Act's policy, purpose, plain meaning, and legislative history
could waive the government's immunity from suit for nonpecuniary
harm.7 3

The remainder of this Recent Development will engage in
statutory interpretation of the Privacy Act to demonstrate that the
Act, even if construed strictly, allows for the recovery of emotional
harm and that the Cooper court should have found that Congress
intended to waive the government's immunity in this instance. To be
sure, the Cooper court acted within the boundaries of its authority by
using sovereign immunity to decide the case. However, a more
judicially-sound and prudent interpretation of the phrase "actual
damages" looks to the history and policy behind the Act. An
examination of this background follows.
IV. THE TROUBLE WITH LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history of a statute is the record of debates,
deliberations, and discussions that were considered in creating the
statutory language that becomes law.74 Legislative history can include
speeches made by any number of legislators on the debate floor;
committee reports from the committees and subcommittees through
which legislation passes in both houses; proposed, rejected, and
accepted amendments; public understanding of issues and terms at
the time of the legislation's passage; the President's signing
statements; and many other opinions of players in the process.75 By
sheer mathematics, the variety of materials coming from legislators
from both sides of an issue will necessarily include evidence judges
can use to support a broad range of potentially inconsistent outcomes.
A 1,455-page document comprises the Legislative History of the
Privacy Act.76 The volume contains contradictory materials, such as
modified to produce more firepower by skillful advocates and opportunistic judges.
Regrettably, because the canons are rule-like in form, judges may rely upon them without
acknowledging that the canons are rooted in controversial values, may have been phrased
in different ways in prior cases, and can evolve over time on a case-by-case basis.").
72. Id.
73. The Johnson court's holding exemplifies this approach. Johnson v. Dep't of
Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1983).
74. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 295.
75. Id.
76. See JOINT COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 1458 (1976) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
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the refusal to adopt a bill with broader recovery provisions 77 and a
statement by the sponsor of the eventually-passed bill that stresses
the importance of protecting against embarrassment,7 8 which suggests
the intent to include broad recovery provisions. The specific problem
with the legislative history of the Privacy Act, as it relates to the
Cooper case, is that the drafters of the bill never directly discussed the
issue of emotional distress. This makes the exercise of divining what
was meant from a number of related, but not exact, statements just as
difficult as interpreting the language of the statute itself.79 This
explains why the courts in Johnson v. Department of Treasury80 and
Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue Service81 examined portions of the
legislative history relevant to the phrase "actual damages" and
reached two diametrically opposed conclusions.
In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit granted recovery for emotional
distress suffered by an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") attorney
whose conduct-unbeknownst to him-had been the subject of an
internal government investigation for several months.8 2 In awarding
damages to the plaintiff, the Johnson court found the phrase "actual
damages" to encompass emotional harm, loss of reputation,
embarrassment, and similar nonpecuniary harms.83 In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit in Fitzpatrick found that the phrase "actual
damages" was strictly limited to pecuniary loss.' The plaintiff in
Fitzpatrick, another IRS employee, ostensibly suffered emotional
distress when the agency publicly disclosed his mental illness after he
took a leave of absence from work. While neither of these cases
binds the Cooper court in the Ninth Circuit, they are probative
because they detail each court's interpretation of the phrase "actual
damages."

77.
78.
79.
look at

S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 303, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 334, 371.
120 CONG. REC. at 36,904, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 803.
This is precisely the reason why Justice Scalia and the New Textualists refuse to
legislative history to interpret statutory language. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. GERKEN,

WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF

APPEALS 91-97 (2007). Justice Scalia does not believe there is "such a thing as a unified
'intent of Congress' with regard to a piece of legislation .... Even if there were an
identifiable 'intent of Congress,' one should not look to legislative history to discern what
that intent is." Id. at 91.
80. 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982).
82. Johnson, 700 F.2d at 972-93.
83. Id. at 972.
84. Fitzpatrick,665 F.2d at 331.
85. Id. at 328.
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The Fifth Circuit in Johnson looked to legislative history to
determine Congress's purpose behind the Privacy Act.8 6 The court
concluded that the legislative history showed that the law intended to
provide the highest level of protection to citizens against government
interference with personal privacy.8 7 In combination with its
legislative history analysis, the Johnson court took a functional
approach to reach its ultimate conclusion about the phrase "actual
damages. '88 Borrowing from Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth
Circuit observed that the kinds of damages involved in violation of
privacy cases are typically mental or emotional, rather than
pecuniary. 9 Consistent with this logic, the Johnson court concluded
that statutes protecting constitutional rights should be tailored to
provide a remedy for violations of those rights.9" Thus, both the
legislative history of the Privacy Act and a functional assessment of
privacy violations led the Fifth Circuit to hold that the phrase "actual
damages" included nonpecuniary harm.9 1
The weakness of the Johnson court's interpretation is the
traditional problem involved with looking at legislative history to find
answers: it is a virtual grab bag of opinions from different legislators
and committees. 92 For example, the Johnson court did not address the
opinion of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, which the
Fitzpatrick court found to be probative. 93
While Johnson cited a wide array of authority for its position, its
Eleventh Circuit counterpart, Fitzpatrick v. IRS, also found
persuasive authority for its opposing viewpoint. The court in
Fitzpatrick ultimately found that the phrase "actual damages" does
not encompass nonpecuniary harm.94 The court relied on the Privacy
Protection Study Commission's interpretation of the phrase. 95 The
Commission, formed by the Act itself in order to report to Congress,
86. Johnson, 700 F.2d at 974-83.
87. See id. at 975-76.
88. Id. at 977-78.
89. Id. at 977 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967)). "Obviously,
mental distress is the normal and typical damage resulting from an invasion of privacy."
Id.
90. Id. at 977 (quoting Carey v. Phiphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978)).
91. Id. at 972.
92. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Leventhal,
who said using legislative history is like "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends").
93. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
94. Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue Serv., 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982).
95. Id.
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does not bind a court to its interpretation of the Privacy Act's
language. 96 The Commission believed that the phrase "actual
damages" only encompassed pecuniary harm. 97 The Commission

clearly opined that the legislature intended the phrase "actual
damages" to be synonymous with "special damages," which do not

include emotional harm.9 8 However, there are two problems with

using the Commission's opinion. First, a non-binding advisory
commission issued the opinion. Second, the Commission's opinion is
logically weak because it argues that the legislature intended to say
"special damages," even though it chose not to use this specific term.99
The reasoning of the Fitzpatrick court made the problem of the

legislative history "grab bag" even more apparent.'" As far as the
problem of disparate legislative history goes, the Fitzpatrick court

took a narrower look at the legislative history in its analysis than the
Johnson court did, making its reasoning even less persuasive. The
Fitzpatrickcourt's view is narrow because it relied on the "evolution"

of the language of the statute, statements made by the bill's sponsor
in the Senate, and the remarks made by a commission formed to
analyze the Privacy Act after its passage.' 01 The court neither looked

to the stated purpose of the Act in its preamble

°2

nor to the

statements of any of the other 545 legislators who may have spoken as
to which types of damages the bill would compensate. 013 The
Fitzpatrick court also did not address the strength of the right to
privacy, which Johnson suggested is prevalent in much of the
legislative history of the Act."°
The Johnson court reiterated that the preamble of the Privacy
Act itself states that "the right to privacy is a personal and
96. Id. at 330 n.5. The Senate bill had aimed to give this group authority to oversee
and enforce the Act, but the compromise bill allowed the group to exist only as a "nonpermanent study commission." Id.
97. Id.at 330-31.
98. Id.
99. The reason that the Commission thought that the phrase "actual damages" only
included pecuniary harm was because it thought the legislature intended this. Id. at 331.
The Commission's opinion is simply another opinion attempting to identify what the
Legislature meant. Some legal scholars and judges have attacked the idea of legislative
intent as a concept which is impossible to discern. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 90 (1991).

100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. Fitzpatrick,665 F.2d at 330-31
102. See generally Fitzpatrick, 665 F.2d 327 (omitting any discussion of the preamble of
the Privacy Act).
103. See id. at 330 (discussing only the view of the congressional committees, including,
but not limited to, the Privacy Protection Study Commission).
104. Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1983).
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fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United
States."1 5 Senator Ervin, a co-sponsor of the Privacy Act, further said
that privacy and "fair, honest" government were foundational
principles of our Constitution and that "[t]heir restatement as
legislative guarantees are vital."'" This language within the Act itself,
supported by Senator Ervin's remarks, speaks to the idea that a right
to privacy is constitutionally based and, thus, may be afforded a
higher level of protection-like compensation from a large pool of
potential damages. 7 While it was valid for the Fitzpatrick court to
examine the opinion of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, the
Johnson court's emphasis on the Privacy Act's preamble and bill
sponsor statements shows that the legislative history is not dispositive.
The Fitzpatrick and Johnson courts both went down the slippery
and murky path of searching for meaning in piles of legislative
history,0 g and neither court presented the history in a persuasive
manner adequate to determine a clear victor. The Cooper court
avoided much of the legislative history guessing game and relied on
the canon of sovereign immunity for its decision.'" However, the
phrase "actual damages" deserves a more careful examination and
interpretation, like that given by the Johnson and Fitzpatrick courts,
in order to avoid relying exclusively on the canon of sovereign
immunity and frustrating legislative history. "'
Johnson and
Fitzpatrick illustrate the ease with which an examination of legislative
history can convincingly lead to opposite outcomes. Because the
legislative history fails to adequately guide the interpretation of the
phrase "actual damages," the purpose for which the statute was
written and the policy driving the statutory language can-and
should-provide the meaning of the statute.1"
105.
106.
769).
107.
108.
history
109.
2008).
110.

Johnson, 700 F.2d at 976 (quoting Privacy Act § 2(a)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)).
Id. (citing 120 CONG. REC. at 36,891, reprintedin SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at
Id. at 977.
See generally SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76 (containing 1,455 pages of legislative
of the Privacy Act).
Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
See, e.g., Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 320 (1986) (using sovereign

immunity to hold that an attorney was not entitled to interest on his attorney's fees

because the statute did not contain an express waiver for the state); Siddiqui v. United
States, 359 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2004) (construing sovereign immunity in favor of the
government and not allowing damages without proof of actual damages).
111. Especially in Cooper's case, where the court establishes on the record that the
government did act illegally, sovereign immunity becomes a difficult argument to accept.
Sovereign immunity carries the important function of allowing the government to perform
its functions without constant fear of lawsuit, but in the case of the Privacy Act, Congress
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V. THE PHRASE "ACTUAL DAMAGES" INCLUDES EMOTIONAL
HARM

A.

Purpose

Where rule-like canons of statutory interpretation conflict with
one another or fail to provide a satisfactory construction of the

statute, jurists turn to theories of statutory interpretation. Jurists and
scholars use these theories as guides in weighing the value of plain

meaning, the canons of statutory interpretation, and the legislative
history'12:

Jurists need a way to approach statutes to determine, among
other things, whether to rely more heavily on the text and
linguistic canons or on other, extra-textual evidence of
meaning; whether to consider legislative history and if so,
which history; whether to consider the purpose of the bill; and

how to determine the weight to give a source the judge will
consider.113

Theories of statutory interpretation provide a unified view for a judge
to keep in mind when weighing all of the above-referenced
evidence.114 Theories differ from canons of statutory interpretation in
that theories provide more general guidelines of addressing the goals

of statutory interpretation and how to reach them, rather than rulelike dictations that explain how to read specific pieces of evidence.115
One such theory-purposivism-is a philosophy that scholars such as
Henry Hart, Jr., Albert Sacks, and William Eskridge employ. 1 6 A
created a statute with the express purpose of constraining government action. The Senate
Committee on Government Operations, which recommended passage of the Privacy Act,
stated that "It]he premise underlying this legislation is that good government and efficient
management require that basic principles of privacy, confidentiality and due process must
apply to all personal information programs and practices of the Federal Government." S.
Rep. No. 93-1183, at 14 (1974), reprintedin SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 167.
112. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 211 (distinguishing between sources of

legislative interpretation, like legislative history and text, and goals of interpretation as
described in theories of legislative interpretation); see also JELLUM, supra note 52, at 16
("Adherents of the different [theories] differ in what they believe best shows the intent of
the enacting legislature and, thus, the meaning of the statute.").
113. JELLUM, supra note 52, at 15.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 11-16.
116. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 221 ("Purposive interpretation of statutes

was a conceptual hallmark of the New Deal, classically articulated in the Hart and Sacks
legal process materials." (citing HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80
(1994))).
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purposivist approach to statutory interpretation means that a jurist
will look to the broader goals of a statute rather than looking for
drafter intent as to a specific provision within a statute." 7 By setting
up the inquiry in this way, "purposivism asks questions about which
there may have been greater consensus in the legislative deliberations
and deploys a tool that more nimbly addresses new or unforeseen
18
circumstances.
When applied to the Privacy Act, the purposivist theory supports
the conclusion that the phrase "actual damages" encompasses
nonpecuniary harm. As evidenced by the failure of both the terms of
the Privacy Act itself and the legislative history to spell out the
meaning of the phrase "actual damages," Congress did not make
explicit whether nonpecuniary harm would be recoverable.119 The
lack of consensus on the meaning of the phrase necessitates some
method of resolution. Applying the canon of sovereign immunity, as
the Cooper court did, does not provide any sort of resolution; it
merely avoids the issue while also frustrating Congress's stated
purpose in enacting the Privacy Act. The damages provision of the
Privacy Act is particularly suited to a purposivist reading both
because the purpose is clearly stated in the legislative history of the
Act and because the statutory language is unclear.
While there is no consensus on the specific meaning of the
phrase "actual damages" within the history of the Privacy Act, there
is agreement that the purpose of the Act is to protect the privacy of
citizens and to restrain the government from interfering with this
right. 2 ' As the Supreme Court noted in Carey v. Phiphus,21 statutes
should be tailored to provide a remedy for the right they protect. 122
As part of its "Congressional Findings and Statement of
Purpose" for the Privacy Act, Congress stated that:
(b) The purpose of this Act [enacting this section and
provisions set out as notes under this section] is to provide
certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of
personal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as
otherwise provided by law, to-... (6) be subject to civil suit for
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See infra Part V.C.
120. See 120 CONG. REC. at 36,904, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 803
("[By privacy,] I mean the right 'to be let alone'-from intrusions by Big Brother in all his
guises") (statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater, Member, J. Comm. Government
Surveillance & Individual Rights).
121. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
122. Id. at 259.
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any damages which occur as a result of willful or intentional
23
action which violates any individual's rights under this Act.
This statement of the Act's purpose, most notably the use of the
term "any" as a term to modify "damages," suggests that the
legislature did not intend to exclude emotional harm from the phrase
"actual damages." The purpose of the Privacy Act is to protect the
privacy of citizens,12 4 and compensating victims for the behavior that
the Privacy Act prohibits is the best way to carry out that purpose.
The issue in Cooper was Cooper's right, under the Privacy Act,
to have his medical records kept private.2 5 Under the court's
reasoning, Cooper was given no remedy despite the denial of his
right, and this decision frustrates the purpose of the Privacy Act. The
appellate court hearing Cooper's appeal has the opportunity to
vindicate the purpose of the Privacy Act, while reading the phrase
"actual damages" in a manner consistent with precedent, 26 using an
acceptable definition of the plain meaning of the term, 127 and
considering the policy behind the Privacy Act. 28
B.

PriorNinth Circuit Decisions Interpretingthe Phrase "Actual
Damages" in Various Legal Contexts

In looking at Ninth Circuit precedential interpretations of the
phrase "actual damages" in contexts other than the Privacy Act, the
Cooper court stated that the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the phrase
"actual damages" to mean economic harm in the case of the
Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") 129 and to mean "objectively
measureable financial loss" in the context of copyright
infringement. 3 ° However, the interpretations of the phrase in these
contexts are distinguishable and, moreover, could support a finding to
include emotional distress in the phrase "actual damages" under the

123. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, 501 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2006)).
124. See id. § 2(a)(4)-(5), 88 Stat. at 501 ("(4) [T]he right to privacy is a personal and
fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States; and (5) in order to
protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal
agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Congress to regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such agencies.").
125. See Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 12-13 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2008).
126. See infra Part V.B.
127. See infra Part V.C.
128. See infra Part V.D.
129. Cooper,No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006)).
130. Id. (citing Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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Privacy Act. On the other hand, Cooper recognized that the Ninth

Circuit found that the phrase "actual damages" included emotional
distress and humiliation in a case addressing violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").3 The Cooper court discussed this
use of the FCRA to support a limited interpretation of the phrase
"actual damages," though, ultimately, sovereign immunity carried its
decision.13 2

The SEA and copyright law are intended to protect the financial
interests of citizens. 133 While the FCRA likewise protects the financial
interests of citizens,3 it also seeks to protect private information,

similar to the Privacy Act. In its statement of purpose, the FCRA lists
"a respect for the consumer's right to privacy" as one of its protected
interests.135 Because of the similarities between the Privacy Act and
the FCRA, the Cooper court should have emphasized Ninth Circuit
precedent addressing the FCRA over the decisions addressing various
other financial interest statutes. These similarities between the
Privacy Act and the FCRA also support an argument about the
purpose of the law. For the FCRA to protect the privacy of creditors,

the Ninth Circuit thought that losses of privacy-a purely emotional
harm-had to be compensable.'3 6 Similarly, the confidentiality of

government records in the Privacy Act protects against humiliation
and invasion of privacy, and the meaning of the phrase "actual
damages" should reflect this purpose.'3 7

Perhaps because of the unclear nature of precedent and
legislative history, the Cooper court did not decide the case on these

bases. Rather, the court made its decision based entirely on the canon

131. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)).
132. Id. at 23-25.
133. The Securities Exchange Act lists its purpose as making the regulation of
securities transactions "reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate
commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more
effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (2006); see
also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the
financial harm endured by copyright holders as a result of the music-sharing Web site
Napster).
134. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2006) (stating that one of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act's purposes is "the continued functioning of the banking system").
135. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
136. See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)
(looking at precedent as well as the history and congressional concern behind the FCRA
to hold that the phrase "actual damages" includes emotional harm).
137. For a discussion of the Act's intention to protect against invasions of privacy, see
supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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of sovereign immunity. 38 In deciding Cooper based solely on

sovereign immunity grounds, the court essentially ignored the way in
which the Ninth Circuit dealt with the phrase "actual damages" in

related contexts. In addition to considering precedent, it may be
helpful to consider the "plain meaning" of the Privacy Act to

determine how the court should have applied the statute to Cooper's
facts.
C.

Plain Meaning

Statutory interpretation also requires an attempt to define the
"plain meaning" of a statute or, as in this case, a term within a
statute.13 9 The plain meaning rule or canon simply assumes that words
have a "plain" or "ordinary" meaning that judges can discern using
tools like dictionaries, other statutes, and the generally "accepted"
definition of the term. 140 The courts in both Johnson and Fitzpatrick
concluded that there was no widely accepted, legal plain meaning for
the phrase "actual damages.' 14' This conclusion is based on the varied
uses of the phrase; in short, courts have defined the term "damages"
differently in different legal contexts.' 42
138. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
139. For many courts, the plain meaning analysis is the first step to statutory
interpretation. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 223; see also United States v.
Yeatts, 639 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the first step of a court in
construing any statute must be to interpret the statute in accordance with its "plain
meaning"); UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. AcT § 19 (1995) ("The text of a statute or
rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.").
140. JELLUM, supra note 52, at 62-67.

141. Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
the phrase "actual damages" has no plain meaning); Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
665 F.2d 327, 329 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that no legal plain meaning exists because the
phrase had not been used consistently either to include or exclude emotional damages in
other federal statutes).
142. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 24-25 (2003) (defining "compensatory
damages" in the contexts of employment law, civil rights violations, property damage, and
breach of contract and explaining that "compensatory damages" are sometimes
synonymous with "actual damages"). Both parties in Johnson also provided controlling
case law to the court which supported their respective views on the "plain meaning" of the
phrase "actual damages." Johnson, 700 F.2d at 974. In employment law, the phrase "actual
damages" was found to be lost wages plus mental anguish in wrongful termination cases.
See Kurtis Kemper, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Damages for Wrongful
Termination of At-Will Employee Under State Law, 86 A.L.R. 5TH 397, 397 (2001). For
violations of the Civil Rights Act, compensatory damages are available for "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). For
breach of contract and property damage claims, the court has construed the phrase "actual
damages" to mean all losses which are recoverable as a matter of right "other than
punitive or exemplary damages." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 24 (2003).
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It should be pointed out, however, that jurists of the increasingly
popular New Textualist theory may look to find plain meaning
beyond the legal uses of the term. 143 New Textualists seek to give

statutory language uniform, universal meaning, which provides
meaning for the average citizen reading the law. 1" A New Textualist
argues that interpreting terms as the average citizen understands
them provides consistency and notice to those bound by the laws.145
Under this view, it can be helpful to turn to a dictionary definition.
Merriam-Webster defines "actual" as: "(a) existing in act and not
merely potentially; (b) existing in fact or reality; or (c) existing or
occurring at the time.' ' 146 This dictionary definition, a representation
of a common understanding of the term, supports a finding that the
phrase "actual damages" includes any damages that have already
occurred, limited only by the temporal requirement. 147 Therefore, for
the New Textualist, "actual" may simply mean existing in the present,
as opposed to being possible or in the future. The dictionary
definition and a common understanding of the term "actual"
corroborate the argument that "actual" damages are not restricted by
a pecuniary-nonpecuniary distinction, but instead, are restricted by
whether the damages are in existence at the time of the injury.
D. Policy
Though a New Textualist would shudder at the thought, 48 courts
should also consider the policy implications of a statute when

interpreting it, especially to determine whether the holding will help
effectuate the purpose of the law.149 The policy implications loom
143. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 660
(1990) ("Traditionally, plain meaning signified that under ordinary principles of grammar
and dictionary definitions of its words, the statutory provision has only one meaning.").
144. See id. at 653 n.128 ("[I]nterpretive doubts are to be resolved by assessing the
meaning that would reasonably have been conveyed to a citizen at the time the law
enacted.") (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia).
145. See id. at 667.
146. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (3d ed. 1993).
147. See JELLUM, supra note 52, at 65 (stating that dictionaries are a common source of
plain meaning, but noting that dictionaries vary and that not all dictionary definitions are
persuasive).
148. New Textualists believe in looking exclusively at the text in statutory
interpretation.

BLACKWELL

COMPANIONS

TO

PHILOSOPHY:

A

COMPANION

TO

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 204 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). Part of
embracing the text as the beginning and end of statutory interpretation means excluding
considerations, like public policy, from statutory analysis. Id.
149. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 46, at 9-15 (discussing the "pragmatic"
approach to statutory interpretation which considers the practical repercussions of a
particular interpretation of a statute). This is a controversial statement with which legal
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large in the context of the Cooper decision. 5 ' If the type of harm most
likely suffered by Privacy Act violations becomes non-compensable,
the efficacy of the Privacy Act as a deterrent on government officials
is dramatically reduced. 5' Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
initially defined the right to privacy as "the right to enjoy life-the
right to be let alone."' 52 The resulting damages from a Privacy Act
violation, then, should compensate citizens who have been deprived
of the ability to enjoy life fully and who feel the harm of government
intrusion.'5 3 Enjoyment of life and the right to be let alone are not
rights which carry monetary value, yet they are the rights that the
Privacy Act should protect. Protecting these rights, then, requires
compensating harm that is not necessarily limited to pecuniary harm.
Allowing victims to recover only pecuniary harm severely limits
the way in which the Privacy Act can compensate citizens for the
harm against which the Act is intended to protect. 5 4 This limitation
also carries a more severe policy implication: under-compensating
victims. If the phrase "actual damages" includes only monetary harm,
the government, in effect, is deterred only from causing monetary
harm against its citizens.' 55 As the Cooper court determined, the
government violated the terms of the Privacy Act by sharing Cooper's

scholars will disagree. As part of recommending a purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation, this Recent Development argues that policy is a crucial consideration in
determining the intended purpose of a piece of legislation.
150. The Coopercourt began its opinion by noting that "[a] good many laudable public
policies collide in the facts at bar. These include policies to ensure the safety of the
nation's airways, to root out waste, fraud and abuse in the Social Security system and to
secure personal privacy of citizens with a leitmotif of policies against discrimination."
Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008).
151. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n.9 (1967) ("In the 'right of privacy' cases
the primary damage is the mental distress from having been exposed to public view....").
152. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890).
153. Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1983) (arguing that
courts should "tailor ... the compensation to the nature of the privacy interest
protected"); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text (evidencing how the language
of the Warren & Brandeis article influenced the Privacy Act).
154. Johnson, 700 F.2d at 977 ("Interpreting 'actual damages' to include only out-ofpocket losses would not only preclude recovery in large numbers of cases but also run
counter to Congress' intent to 'promote governmental respect for the privacy of citizens
by requiring.., agencies and their employees to observe ... constitutional rules.' " (citing

S. Rep. No. 93-1183, at 1 (1974), reprintedin SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 154))).
155. Id. at 971 ("In addition, confining 'actual damages' to out-of-pocket losses would
lessen government motivation to comply with the Act and thereby run counter to
Congress' intent.").
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records between
agencies, yet the government has not suffered any
15 6
consequences.
CONCLUSION

There are no straightforward answers to the problems involved
in discerning clear meaning from the cryptic code of our law. Perfect
consistency by judges seems to be a hopeless goal given the wide
array of beliefs, philosophies, and whims of those comprising the
judiciary. As evidenced by the Fitzpatrick and Johnson decisions,
legislative history is not dispositive in determining the meaning of a
statute. Instead, courts should primarily consider the purpose of the
statute in reaching a decision. Purposivism provides a balance
between honoring the goals of the legislature, while allowing for
practical solutions to the problems created by legislative ambiguity.
Purposivism also restrains courts because it gives the courts a goal to
effect, forcing courts to advance specific policies. It becomes simpler
to make a broad inquiry into the purpose of a statute, rather than to
try to discern the very specific meaning of a single term or phrase in a
statute. If the Cooper court had used a purposivist approach, the
holding would show that the judiciary can vindicate the purpose of
the statute when the legislature leaves necessary flexibility in the text.
The drafters of the Privacy Act intended to protect plaintiffs like
Stanmore Cooper from violations of his privacy, from
embarrassment, and from emotional suffering. The drafters of the
Privacy Act specifically sought to deter government officials from the
exact conduct exhibited by the agencies in Cooper, and without the
remedy proposed here, there is no deterrent against this conduct.
Because the legislative language and the purpose of the Privacy Act
seek to protect citizens from embarrassment and from invasion into
their private papers and records, and because not compensating for
that emotional harm would lead to a minimal deterrence against such
conduct, the phrase "actual damages" within the Privacy Act should
include emotional and mental harms as compensable injuries. The
Cooper court, therefore, should have waived the government's
immunity in order to allow Stanmore Cooper to recover for his
emotional harm.
NICOLE M. QUALLEN

156. See Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. C 07-1383, slip. op. at 19 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2008).

